University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014
1970

The effects of distraction and discrepancy size on
counterargument production and attitude change.
William A. De Lamarter
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses

De Lamarter, William A., "The effects of distraction and discrepancy size on counterargument production
and attitude change." (1970). Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014. 1444.
https://doi.org/10.7275/fqw4-9y72

This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass
Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

THE EFFECTS OF DISTRACTION AND DISCREPANCY SIZE ON

COUNTERARGUMENT PRODUCTION AND ATTITUDE CHANGE

A Thesis Presented
By

William A. De Laraarter

Submitted to the Graduate School of the

University of Massachusetts in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science

Department of Psychology
October 1970

THE EFFECTS OF DISTRACTION AND DISCREPANCY SIZE ON

COUNTERARGUMENT PRODUCTION AND ATTITUDE CHANGE

A Thesis Presented
By

William

A.

De Lamarter

Approved as to content and style by:

Ill

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

At this time

I

would like to thank Dr. Alice

H.

Eagly

for her assistance in the preparation of this thesis.

Her

excellent criticisms and patient guidance have been more than
appreciated.

In addition,

Berger and Samuel

Z.

thanks are extended to Drs. Seymour

Himmelfarb, both members of my committee,

for their comments and encouragement.
I

would also like to thank Mr. Robert

A.

Sacks for his

generous, although not always uncomplaining, assistance in
the preparation of the video tapes, maintenance of the

equipment,

and scoring of the data.

Finally,
Inc.

thanks are extended to Calvin Communications,

of Kansas City, Missouri,

for their permission to

duplicate their film Overs and Outs.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

page

Method

page 10

Results

page 15

Discussion

page

References

paqe 34

1

2o

V

LIST OF TABLES

Table

1

-

Mean Posttest Attitude Scores

page

Table

2

-

Mean Combined Comprehension Scores

page 30

Table

3

-

Sums of the Three Types of Counterarguments
(Brock, Message Rejection, and Source
Rejection) and the Mean Total Counterarguments

page 31

29

Table 4

-

Mean Source Rejection Scores

page 32

Table

-

Summary of Correlations between Attitude
Scores and Potential Mediators of
Attitude Change

page 33

5

,

vi

ABSTRACT

Festinger and Maccoby (1964) while studying the effects
of distraction upon attitude change concluded that
counter-

arguing is the mediator of distraction effects, while Haaland
and Vankatesan (1968) concluded that comprehension is the

major mediator.

Possibly,

then,

counterargument production

is only elicited under a limited set of conditions.

(1967)

Brock's

research indicated that counterargument production

increases as the discrepancy between the subject's own position
and that advocated by the communication increases

.

Thus,

it

was hypothesized that counterarguing mediates the effects of

distraction upon attitude change only when the discreoancy
sufficient to evoke counterarguing.

is

To test this hypothesis

the following study was conducted.

The present study experimentally manipulated both visual

distraction and discrepancy size.

Neither of the independent

variables was found to have had

ignif ican t impact on the

attitude scores
less,

.

However

,

a s

distracted subj ects did comprehend

as well as counterargue less.

Weak support for Brock's

finding that counterarguing increases with discrepancy was
also obtained.

The implications of these dependent measure

responses are discussed as mediators of the effects of

distraction upon attitude change.

INTRODUCTION
In an early formulation of the effects of distraction
upon

attitude change, Festinger and Maccoby (1964) hypothesized
that distraction interferes with an individual's ability to

counterargue the content of

a

persuasive communication.

Furthermore, they hypothesized, reduced counterargument

production mediates attitude

change.

Since then, studies

which have attempted to test this hypothesis have shown

mixed results.

The purpose of this study is to introduce

discrepancy size as an additional variable which may clear up
some of the disagreement over both results and proposed

mediators of attitude change.
A part of the confusion over experimental results may be

traced to the types of distraction which have been used.

One

such distraction involves the rating of the personality of
the communicator.
1968,

1969;

(Freedman and Sears, 1965;

Miller and Baron, 1968)

Baron and Miller,

In the basic paradigm,

the subject is asked to attend either to the personality of
the speaker (distraction) or to the content of the communica-

tion (no distraction).

The present analysis ~^es not consider

these studies to be an adequate test of the original Festinger

and Maccoby (1964) hypothesis since as Miller and Baron (1968)

have attempted to demonstrate, the personality-rating distraction probably increases the salience of the speaker

credibility cues.

A distraction of this type leads to

increased attitude change only when the credibility of the
speaker is high.

Therefore, Miller and Baron hypothesize that
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credibility, and not counter arguing, is the mediator of

attitude change in the personality-rating distraction studios.
Nevertheless, studies which have used an irrelevant

distraction have also shown mixed results.

In a series of

three studies, Festinger and Maccoby (1964) had fraternity
and non-fraternity men listen to

against campus fraternities.

a

communicator argue strongly

Distracted subjects viewed

a

humorous film upon which was superimposed the anti-fraternity

communication while non-distracted subjects viewed
the communicator presenting his opinions.

a

film of

In the first two

studies, the authors failed to find any differences in attitude

change between distracted and non-distracted subjects or

between fraternity and non-fraternity men.

They explained

their results by noting that neither of the schools where the

studies were conducted had particularly strong fraternity
systems.

The third study, conducted at

a

school with

a

strong

fraternity system, did show that distracted fraternity men
changed their attitudes concerning fraternities toward that

advocated by the message more than non-distracted fraternity
men.

In attempting to demonstrate that counterarguing is the

mediator of attitude change, Festinger and Maccoby hypothesized
that if one is unable to counterargue

should be

a

a

communication, there

positive correlation between resistance to influence

and rejection of the speaker.

Moreover,

the correlations

should be higher for distracted subjects than for non-distracted
subjects assuming distraction interferes with one's ability
to counterargue a communication.

This hypothesis was confirmed

for distracted and non-distracted
men.
In a study by Haaland and Vankatesan

was found to reduce attitude change,

(1908),

distraction

finding contrary to

a

those of the Pestinger and Maccoby (1964) study.

Subjects in

the Haaland and Vankatesan study listened to
either pro or con

arguments concerning lowering the voting age to
18.

Two

types of distraction (visual or behavioral) were
varied in

2X2

factorial design.

a

A humorous film constituted the

visual distraction while non-distracted subjects viewed

a

communicator presenting his speech as in the Pestinger and

Maccoby (1964) study.

In addition,

subjects in the behavioral

distraction condition filled out questionnaires while viewing
the presentation.

The results indicated

either visual or behavioral, results

distraction,

lh.it

in

attitude- change

less,

than no distraction, findings which clearly contradict the

Festinger and Maccoby (1964) results.

Haaland and Vankatesan

also measured recall of communication content.

They round

that non-distracted subjects comprehended the message better
than d

i

s. t

rar t ed sub ect
j

Gardner

(196G),

studying persuasive market

had subjects rate live

scale.

I

irst

run movie:

,

on

inc.]

appeals.,

desirability

a

A communication advocating the second most desired

movie was prepared,

distracted by

cars,

a

subjects woi

or

track,

(b)

simultaneously around

indicated no

o

eithej

having subjects guide

(a)

rapidly around
slot

.

si gn.i

f.i

ran

1

a

not

distiaeted

oi

single slot car

having subjects guide two
a

track.

attitude change

While his results
el

I

eel s

,

he did show

that recall of message content decreased as
degree of dis-

traction increased.
Not only is there inconsistency in experimental results
but there is also disagreement regarding the mediators of
the

observed effects of distraction on attitude change.

It should

be remembered that Festinger and Maccoby (1964) presented

indirect evidence that distraction interferes with counter-

argument production.

By noting that a positive relationship

between source rejection and resistance to influence implies

reduced counterargument production, Festinger and Maccoby (1964)

hypothesized

a

reduction in counterargument production as the

mediator of attitude change in distraction studies.

Haaland and Vankatesan (1968) favored
pretation.

a

However,

learning theory inter-

They argued that the subject must comprehend the

content of the message in order to learn the new attitude.
Distraction, by reducing comprehension, interferes with the

learning process.

Thus,

there should be less attitude change

in distraction conditions.

this interpretation.

Their results are consistent with

Gardner's (1966) results also yielded

reduced message comprehension for distracted subjects.

However,

due to the methodological weaknesses of this study and the

non-significance of the attitude change results, interpretation
of recall measures in light of the comprehension mediator

argument is extremely tenuous.
vSince the

distraction studies do not provide direct

evidence that either comprehension or counterarguing mediate
the distraction effects on attitude change,

it is appropriate
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to examine the general attitude change literature
in order to

determine the status of the comprehension mediator and the

counterargument mediator.

In his review of the comprehension

mediator literature, Greenwald (1968) points out that learning
an argument is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition

for persuasion.

In addition,

Greenwald notes that empirical

support for the comprehension mediator is generally weak.

Counterargument production has not been widely studied
though numerous investigators have assumed that an individual
evokes, subvocally,

arguments which attempt to refute arguments

presented by the communicator.

Due to the covert nature of

the phenomenon it is difficult to obtain direct evidence of

counterarguing.
of McGuire's

For example,

"inoculations" against attitude change.

(1964)

McGuire found that

counterarguing may be an aspect

a

refutational defense is more effective

than a supportive defense in inducing resistance to attitude
change.

Inoculation involves presenting

a

weak attack on

a

cultural truism while providing counterarguments to refute the
attack.

According to McGuire, these refutational arguments

"inoculate" the subject against a much stronger attack later and,
thus,

increase an individual's resistance to persuasion.

It

would appear reasonable to assume that these "inoculation"
provide the material from which counterarguments are constructed.
Therefore, McGuire's research program on resistance to

persuasion indicates indirect support for the position that
counterarguing mediates resistance to attitude change.
The warning literature also provides indirect support
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for the counterargument mediator approach.
(1965)

informed subjects of the topic of

a

Freedman and Sears
counteratti tudinal

communication either ten minutes or two minutes before the

presentation of the speech.

In addition,

distraction was

manipulated by instructing some subjects to attend to the
content of the communication (no distraction) while others

were instructed to attend to the personality of the communicator
(distraction).

While not obtaining any effects of distraction

on attitude change,

the authors did find that the ten minute

forewarning made subjects more resistant to attitude change
than the subjects who received no warning.

argued that forewarning

a

It might be

subject as to the content of the

message allows him time to marshal counterarguments to refute
the communicator's arguments.

Although Freedman and Sears

neither provided nor measured counterarguments they did allow
the subject time to develop his own counterarguments.

Janis and Terwilliger (1962), in studying the effects of

various fear appeals on attitude change, developed

a

device

termed the "auditory feedback suppressor", which allowed

subject to speak without hearing himself.

a

It was hoped that

this device would make overt any covert thoughts or ideas

concerning the communication.

Subjects heard either

a

high

or low fear arousing communication regarding smoking and

cancer.

Janis and Terwilliger found that low threat was

more effective in changing attitudes than high even though
this finding is tempered by its low level of significance
(p

<

.10).

However, the authors found that there were more

7

communication rejection statements in the high threat condition
than in the low threat condition.

If these rejection state-

ments may be termed counterarguments, then this study also

provides some evidence that counterarguing mediates resistance
to attitude change.

Having demonstrated indirect support for the counterarguing

mediator position, it becomes relevant to ask what determines
counterargument production.

Perhaps counterarguing functioned

as a mediator of attitude change in the Festinger and Maccoby

(1964) study and yet not in other studies because counter-

arguing is a salient response only under
conditions.

a

set of limited

In investigating these limited conditions,

Brock

(1967) hypothesized that as the discrepancy between the

subject's position on

a

given issue and that advocated by

the persuasive communication increases,

argument production increases.

would be reading
their university.

a

the amount of counter-

Brock told subjects that they

message advocating

a

tuition increase at

Discrepancy was varied by proposing dif-

ferent amounts of increase.

Before reading the actual message,

subjects were asked to list "thoughts and ideas
the tuition increase.

:

concerning

These thoughts and ideas were subsequently

scored for counterargument production.

His results clearly

indicated that counterargument production increases directly
with discrepancy.
If counterarguing increases as discrepancy

increases,

production,
then distraction, by interfering with counterargument

attitude change only
is likely to lead to reduced resistance to
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when discrepancy is moderate to high.

If the discrepancy is

insufficient to evoke much counterarguing

,

then distraction

should have little effect on attitude change through
the

counterargument mediator.

It should be remembered that in

the Festinger and Maccoby (1964) study,

fraternity and non-

fraternity men were distracted while listening to

worded anti-fraternity communication.
is important,

If,

a

in fact,

strongly
discrepancy

distraction should lead to increased attitude

change for fraternity men and no change for non-fraternity
men since the message was clearly discrepant for the former

group and probably not very discrepant for the latter group.
Inspection of the Festinger and Maccoby results indicate that

fraternity men who were distracted did change their attitudes
more than non-distracted fraternity men, and that there were
no differences in attitude change for non-fraternity men.

The issue employed in the Gardner (1966) research was
only mildly discrepant since the message advocated the second
most desirable movie from

a

list of five.

While Gardner did

not find any effect of distraction on attitude change, he did

find that distracted subjects recalled less oi the content
of the message than did non-distracted subjects.

These results

appear to indicate that when discrepancy is low, one attends

more to the distraction and thus does not comprehend the message

Haaland and Vankatesan (1968) had subjects listen to
either pro or con messages concerning an 18 year old voting
age.

Subjects were divided into the pro or con message groups

on the basis of an issue pretest.

Since all subjects who

responded on the con side of the mid-point of

a

seven point

scale were placed in the pro message group
and subjects on
the pro side were placed in the con group, the
message was

highly discrepant for only those subjects with highly
polarized
attitudes.

Therefore, it

is

degree of discrepancy between

felt that on the average the
a

subject's initial position

and that advocated by the communication is only mild,
or

perhaps moderate.

Recalling Brock's (1967) findings on

discrepancy and counterargument production, it should be
noted that
arguing.

a

mild discrepancy only evokes minimal counter-

If reduced counterarguing mediates the effect of

distraction on attitude change and mild discrepancy only
evokes minimal counterarguing, it

is

probable that distraction

does not affect attitude change through the counterarguing

mediator at mild discrepancy levels.

Yet the Haaland and

Vankatesan results indicated that distraction reduced attitude
change.

They also found that distraction interfered with

message comprehension.

This pattern of findings can be

explained if one assumes that with
subjects attend more
a

a

mildly discrepant message

the distraction

than to the message,

tendency which reduces comprehension and thus attitude change
In conclusion,

previous research supports the hypothesis

that the amount of discrepancy determines whether or not

counterarguments are produced, and, therefore, whether or not

distraction reduces resistance to attitude change by reducing

counterargument production.

If discrepancy is sufficient to

evoke counterarguments (moderate to high), and distraction
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interferes with counterargument production,
then reduced
counterarguing should lead to reduced resistance
to persuasion.
If the discrepancy is mild, counterarguments
are not evoked
to any great extent and therefore are
unable to affect attitude
change.
In the mild discrepancy condition, if
the distraction
is sufficiently interesting,

the subject may attend more to

the distraction than to the communication.

Increased attention

to the distraction may result in reduced message
comprehension.

The previous two sentences arc logical if one assumes that

a

mildly discrepant communication is neither as interesting nor
as attention arousing as a highly discrepant communication.

the reduced attention assumption is correct,

If

the mild discrepancy

conditions should show reduced message comprehension.
The present study will investigate these predictions by

systematically varying discrepancy and by including measures
of attitude change,

counterarguing, and message comprehension.

METHOD
su bj ects

Subjects (N

a

133) were students at the University of

Massachusetts, approximately half of which were fulfilling an
experimental participation requirement in introductory psychology
Other subjects recruited from the dormitories participated

voluntarily.

Subjects were randomly assigned to the experi-

mental conditions described below so that each condition

contained nineteen subjects.

For convenience, subjects were

run in small groups varying in size from

1

to

7.
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Design
The design was a

2

X

3

factorial with two distraction

conditions (present or absent) and three discrepancy levels
(low,

moderate, or high) as the independent variables.

Since

subjects were not pretested, an additional group of nineteen

subjects served as controls.

The control group simply filled

out a series of attitude scales to obtain

a

base line attitude

from which change could be measured.
Man inula t ions

Distraction

.

Distraction, as in previous research (Festinger

and Maccoby, 1964;
of a humorous film

Haaland and Vankatesan, 1968), consisted
(

Overs and Outs

)

upon which was superimposed

a

persuasive communication.

a

film of the communicator presenting his speech.

Non-distracted subjects viewed
All films

were taped on ^ inch Scotch Video Tape and presented on an 18
inch television monitor connected to

a

Sony AV-3200 Video

Tape Recorder.

Discrepancy

.

Results of an issue pretest conducted with

a

different group of subjects indicated that students were
initially opposed to increasing the amount of

'

ime faculty

members should be required to spend conducting research and

reducing the amount of time faculty members spend teaching.
Therefore, since this topic is clearly counteratti tudinal

,

a

ten minute communication was developed advocating increased

research time for faculty members.

Discrepancy was varied

by manipulating the percentage of time that the communication

advocated faculty should spend in the laboratory as opposed

12

to the classroom.

The communication stated that presently

faculty are required to spend 35 percent of their time
conducting

research and 65 percent of their time teaching.

A series of

consistent and logical arguments were then presented to the
effect that the research percentage should be increased.

It

was felt that the cogency of these arguments would prevent

any outright rejection of the communication.

At the end of

the communication specific recommendations concerning the

research-teaching issue were made.
condition,

In the low discrepancy

it was recommended that 45 percent of a faculty

member's time should be spent doing research and 55 percent
of his time should be spent teaching.

In the moderate dis-

crepancy condition, the advocated split was 60 percent for

research and 40 percent for teaching.

In the high discrepancy

condition, the communicator argued for increasing research
time to 75 percent and reducing teaching time to 25 percent.

Procedure
Subjects in small groups were seated in front of
vision set.

a

tele-

The experimenter introduced himself and then

explained that he was conducting an evaluation of

Educational Television series.

a

proposed

Subjects were given the

following instructions.
You will shortly be viewing a pilot program for a
projected Educational Television series concerning
Since the sponsors
the quality of academic life.
would like some type of evaluation of the program
before it is publicly presented, the Psychology
Department has volunteered to conduct an evaluation.
So, I would like you to carefully watch the program
and then fill out a questionnaire at its conclusion.
This particular program concerns faculty time spent

s
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on teaching and research.
The speaker is Dr. Andrew
Sherwood, Assistant Professor of Psychology at UCLA.

Subjects were also told that the communicator would
be reading
his talk and thus there were some errors in pronunciation
as

well as pauses.

In addition subjects were warned that they

may see something unusual since ETV was studying different
types of presentation.

At this point the television was turned on and the subjects
viewed

a

program fulfilling the requirements of one of the six

experimental groups mentioned above.
program, subjects were handed

booklet containing the dependent

a

measures described more fully below.
all the scales in the booklet,

At the completion of the

After they had completed

subjects were fully debriefed

as to the manipulations and purposes of the experiment and

dismissed.

Control group subjects were not given the above

instructions but merely told that they were to complete

a

series of questions concerning the quality of academic life.
As with the others,

control subjects were debriefed as to the

purposes and manipulations of the experiment.
De pen dent Moo ur es

Attitud e.
a

Attitude toward the communication was determined by

single attitude item.

Subjects indicated their feelings

by checking any position along

a

seven point response scale.

The end points of the scale were labeled either "completely
agree" or "completely disagree".

Specifically,

the item asked

the subjects if they felt that faculty members should spend

more time doing research and less time teaching.

.
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Comprehension

As

.

a

check on whether or not subjects compre-

hended the message, subjects were asked to list

as

many of

the arguments presented in the speech as they
could remember.
In addition,

six multiple choice type

items were included to

check the comprehension of specific facts in the
communication.

Counterar gument Production

with either

a

"yes''

.

Subjects were asked to respond

or "no" to a guestion asking them if they

had any "thoughts, ideas, or reactions to the communication

while listening to it."

If a subject answered "yes",

he was

asked to estimate the percentage of his reactions which were
relevant to the communication.

In addition,

he was asked

to list these relevant thoughts and ideas which had occurred

to him while listening to the persuasive communication.

A

lined page in the booklet was provided for these reactions

with the word "idea" to the left of each line.

In one analysis

these ideas were scored as counterarguments according to the

criteria described by Brock (1967).

To be scored as a Brock

counterargument, the idea must have been

a

declarative state-

ment specifically against increasing faculty research time

which mentions an unoesirable consequence of such an action.
Simple statements of opposition, statements in favor of
the communication,

and alternative proposals were not

counted as Brock counterarguments.

If two or more Brock

counterarguments were similar, they were counted as one single

counterargument
These "ideas" were also scored for message and source

rejection counterarguments.

To qualify as

a

message rejection

.
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counterargument the declarative statement must
have expressed
some doubt as to the veracity of either
the total communication
or a specific argument contained within the
communication.
Moreover, the sentence must not have indicated
an undesirable

consequence of adopting the communication recommendation.
Doubt could be expressed through either outright
rejection
(e.g.,

"I

don't believe

(e.g.,

"I

doubt that

")

").

or by expressing reservations

To be scored as a source rejection

counterargument the sentence must contain some type of source
derogation.

While these two classifications do not involve

specifying an undesirable consequence of adopting the
recommendation, they do provide

a

means of coping with

a

counteratti tudinal communication and are thus types of counterarguments.

Other Measures

.

In addition to the preceding,

measures of

source rejection, message rejection, recall of message
recommendation, and the degree to which the distraction was

perceived as distracting were obtained.

Also, a measure

designed to tap the reinforcement value of the humorous film
presentation was incJ ^ed.

These measures were included to

give an additional check on the effects of the various

manipulations
Finally, subjects were asked to describe the purposes of

the study in order to determine if there was any awareness of
the experimental hypotheses.

RESULTS

A series of analyses of variance was calculated to
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determine the effectiveness of the independent
variable
manipulations.

A measure of the degree to which the presenta-

I

tion was found to be distracting yielded a highly
significant

main effect of distraction

(F =

117.07, df = 1/108, p

This main effect indicated that viewing

listening to

communication

a

simply viewing

a

a

.001).

humorous film while

much more distracting than

v;as

communicator present

message.

a

In addition,

an estimate of how much time each subject spent thinking

about the message while it was being presented yielded

a

main effect of distraction

.001)

(F

= 26.43,

df = 1/108,

p

<C

strong

with distraction inhibiting thought about the communication.
Thus, both measures are indicative of

manipulation.

a

strong distraction

Measures asking subjects to state the advocated

percentages of time to be spent on teaching and research for the
messages they heard resulted in significant main effects of

discrepancy for both the teaching recommendation
df = 2/108, p < .001)
df = 2/108, p ^

IF_

-

and the research recommendation

.001).

387.50,
(F

=

341.45,

While the teaching recommendation

measure did not yield any other effects, the research recom-

mendation measure did result in
(F_

=

3.51,

crepancy.

dr_

=

2/108, p

^

.05)

a

significant interaction

between distraction and dis-

Inspection of the cell means indicated that dis-

tracted subjects inflated the research recommendation manipulation at mild discrepancies (X = 48.16), recalled the recom-

mendation almost perfectly at moderate discrepancy, and

overrecalled it at high discrepancy

(X =

72.89).

No dis-

traction subjects underrecalled the research recommendation
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manipulation at low discrepancy

(X = 44.74)

and specified it

almost perfectly at moderate and high discrepancy
levels.
Since deviations from the manipulated discrepancy
levels are
slight, the manipulation was still highly
significant
for

both levels of distraction.
The attitude data (Table

1)

did not yield significant main

effects of either distraction or discrepancy.
was no interaction.

Moreover, there

However, a Dunnett's test demonstrated

that each experimental group differed from the control group
at

Insert Table

1

about here

at least the .01 level on the attitude measure which attests to

the persuasive impact of the message.

requesting

list of the specific arguments used in the com-

a

munication yielded
df = 1/108,

A comprehension measure

p

^

a

.01)

significant effect of distraction

(F =

8.46

as did scores from a series of multiple

choice comprehension questions

(F =

6.12,

df = 1/108,

o<

.05).

Both measures indicated that the distracted subjects were less
able to comprehend the message.

measures also yielded
traction

(F = 11.57,

vious findings.

Summing the two comprehension

highly significant

a

df = 1/108, p 4^.005)

Table

2

m. Ln

effect of dis-

confirming the pre-

presents the combined comprehension

score means for the experimental groups.

Insert Table

Table

3

2

about here

presents the data for the three types of counter

rguments as well as the mean total counterarguments for each
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experimental condition.

Since the data for each of the three

types of counterarguments (Brock, message
rejection, and

source rejection) were nearly dichotomous with
many subjects
Insert Table

about here

3

making only one counterargument while others failed to
counterargue,

the F statistic was inappropriate.

Therefore,

a

X

multiple classification designs (Sutcliffe, 1957) using

a

2

for

yes-

no classification pooling all subjects who counter argued and
all subjects who did not counterargue was computed for each

type of counterargument.

Analysis of the counterargument data

scored according to criteria established by Brock (1967)
indicated weak effects of both distraction
2
p <C.10) and discrepancy (X = 5.70, df =

expected directions and no interaction.

(X

2

p

2,

=

<

2.89,
.

10

)

of =
in

1,

the

That is to say, fewer-

subjects coun terargued in the distraction condition and the

frequency of subjects who did counterargue increased as discrepancy size increased.

counterarguments yielded
(X

"

=

5.59,

_df

=

1,

%

The X
a

2

analysis for source rejection

significant main effect of distraction

.01) with more subjects in the no dis-

traction condition rejecting the source.

A X

2

analysis for

message rejection counterarguments resulted in no significant
effects.

Inspection of the data indicated that summing all

counterarguments yielded

a

distribution of total counterarguments

which did not seriously deviate from normality.

Therefore, an

analysis of variance was computed for these data and resulted
in a significant main effect of distraction

(F =

7.34,

df_

=

1/108,
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P

<

.01) with distracted subjects counterarguing
less.

When the source rejection items were summed
and an analysis
of variance calculated, a significant
interaction between distraction and discrepancy (F = 4.94, df =
2/108, p < .01) resulted
Table 4 presents the mean source rejection scores
for all

Insert Table

experimental conditions.

about here

4

Tests of the simple effects of dis-

traction at levels of discrepancy indicated that the only
sig-

nificant effect of distraction occurred at the high discrepancy
level

(F

=

7.66,

df = 2/108,

p

<

.001),

distraction, high discrepancy and X
discrepancy.

=

with X = 7.26 for no

9.63 for distraction, high

Similarly, message rejection items were summed

before an analysis of variance was computed.

While message

rejection scores did not result in any significant effects, the

pattern of message rejection means did parallel the pattern

obtained for source rejection means.
variance calculated for

a

measure designed to tap the reinforcement

value of distraction yielded
(F = 6.15,

variance indicated that

a

main effect of distraction

^.05).

df = 1/108, p
a

Finally, an analysis of

This final analysis of

humorous film distraction was found

to be aversive rather than reinforcing.

A series of correlations between attitude change and

responses that are potential mediators of the effect of distraction on attitude change was examined.
total counterarguing, source rejection,

Combined comprehension,

and reinforcement

value of distraction were selected as potential mediators
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since all exhibited significant effects of
distraction in
the analyses of variance.

Table

5

presents the correlations

between attitude scores and these potential mediators for both

distraction conditions as well as collapsed over all subjects.
The reported correlations are pooled over discrepancy levels.

Inspection of Table

5

indicates that the correlations between

Insert Table

5

about' here

attitude scores and combined comprehension are all non-significant.

Thus,

there is no consistent relationship between

these two measures in this study.

The highly significant cor-

relations between attitude scores and total counterargument

production indicates that the more one is able to counterargue
the communication,

the less he accepts it.

between attitude scores and sour

:e

The correlations

rejection are weak although

the correlation collapsed over all subjects is significant due
to an increase in the df

.

The latter correlation indicates that

the more one rejects the source, the less likely he is to accept
the communication.

All correlations between attitude scores

and the reinforcement value of distraction are non-significant

indicating no clear relationship between these two measures.
discussiol;

Festinger and Haccoby (1964) hypothesized that distraction,
by interfering with counterargument production,

increased attitude change.
however,

found

a

leads to

Haaland and Vankatesan (1968),

decrease in attitude change for distracted

subjects and concluded that distraction, by reducing message
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comprehension, leads to reduced attitude
change.

The present

investigation takes the point of view that
these two studies
might be compatible if counterargument
production is elicited
under a limited set of conditions. Recalling
Brock's
(1967)

findings that counterargument production
increases as the
discrepancy between the subject's own position
and that

advocated by the persuasive communication increases,
it was
decided that discrepancy could be the variable which
could

resolve the conflicting experimental results.

present study was conducted.

Thus,

the

It was hypothesized that dis-

traction would yield increased attitude change in those

discrepancy conditions (moderate and high) in which counterarguing would be strongly evoked.

In the low discrepancy

condition where coun terarguing would not be evoked to any
extent, distraction should lead to reduced attitude change.

Unfortunately,

the attitude measure in this study did not

yield any significant main effects or an interaction.

An

explanation of the non-significance of this measure will be

proposed later in this section.
did indicate that di

'

a

comprehension measures

^acted subjects were less able to

comprehend the message.
also resulted in

However,

A measure of total counterarguing

main effect of distraction with distracted

sub3ects less able to counterargue.

The X

2

analyses of the

three types of counterarguments yielded mixed results.

While

analysis of Brock counterarguments resulted in weak effects
of both distraction and discrepancy at the .10 level of

significance, analysis of message rejection counterarguments
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resulted in no significant effects.

However, the analysis of

source rejection counterarguments yielded

a

significant main

effect of distraction.
In addition to the preceding,

interesting effects.
value of

a

two other measures yielded

The first, a measure of the reinforcing

humorous film distraction, indicated that the

distraction was found to be aversive rather than reinforcing.
The second,

measure of source rejection, yielded

a

a

sig-

nificant interaction between distraction and discrepancy.
This interaction which was not predicted may be related to
the fact that the distracting presentation was found to be

more aversive than the non-distracting one.
reactions to
a

a

Possibly, subject

highly discrepant communication coupled with

presentation found to be aversive combined to yield an

especially strong source rejection response for distracted
subjects at the high discrepancy level.

Inspection of the

data indicates that this interpretation is at least plausible.

The implications of the source rejection measure for the

attitude data will be explored later in this section.
Unfortunately, the predicted discrepancy interaction

between distraction and discrepancy with distracted subjects

counterarguing less and non-distracted subjects counter arguing

more as discrepancy increased failed to materialize.

However,

it should be noted that Brock counterarguments yielded a

weak effect of discrepancy (.10 level of significance) which
lends some support to Brock's (1967) findings that counter-

arguing increases with discrepancy.

The overall failure of
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discrepancy to yield significant results could be attributed
to a general failure of the discrepancy manipulation.

However, the appropriate manipulation checks indicated that
this interpretation is unlikely since subjects did perceive
the intended differences in the various discrepancy

recommendations.

Since subjects were informed of both the

general recommendation of the communication as well as the

discrepancy recommendation specific to an experimental condition,

it could be argued that the subjects rejected so

strongly the general recommendation that research time be
increased that the specific recommendation designed to

manipulate discrepancy had no impact on attitude.

However,

this interpretation tends to be contradicted by the results
of the Dunnett's tests

(comparing each experimental group's

attitude scores with those of the control group) which indicated
that the communication did have
subjects*

a

significant impact on

attitudes.

The failure of the discrepancy manipulation to yield

significant effects becomes more understandable if one views
the message recommendation as an attack on

truism (McGuire, 1964).

a

c/pe of cultural

In his development of inoculation

theory, McGuire defines a cultural truism as a widely held

belief which is rarely, if ever, attacked.

However, when

attacked, cultural truisms are more susceptible to change
than are other beliefs because the subject lacks counter-

arguments in his cognitive files to refute the attack.
the teaching-research issue is

a

Since

lively topic of controversy
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on many university campuses,

one might argue that subjects

would have readily available numerous counterarguments
concerning the issue.

However, debate on the issue usually

centers around how much faculty members should increase

teaching time and decrease research time, which is the

opposite of the general recommendation.

Since rarely is

anyone heard advocating an increase in research time while

decreasing teaching time, there is little reason for subjects
to have available refutational arguments to counter the

advocated position.

Therefore, it is felt that the general,

message recommendation could

onstitute an attack on

a

cultural truism, for which subjects had few refutational

arguments to counter the message.

The extremely low frequency

of coun terarguing in general and Brock counterarguments

specifically (see Table

3)

priate counterarguments in

is indicative of a lack of approa

subject's cognitive file.

Thus,

without counterarguments in a subject's cognitive file, it
was impossible for the discrepancy manipulation to operate.
In order to determine whether discrepancy is simply not of

importance as an ellcitor of counterarguments in the

distraction situation or whether discrepancy failed to

operate in the predicted manner due to the issue employed,
further research should be conducted.
this explanation,

future research should use

of subjects as well as empl oying

for which

a

In order to examine

a

a

larger sample

counteratt itudinnl issue

subject's exposure to counterarguments is

experimentally manipulated.
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The failure of the attitude measure to yield significant
effects is puzzling.

It is possible that some or all of the

four proposed mediators (combined comprehension, total counter-

argument production, source rejection, and the reinforcement
value of distraction) of the effects of distraction upon

attitude change combined psychologically in such
as to cancel one another's effects on attitudes.

a

manner
In order to

investigate the effects of these potential mediators of
attitude change, certain correlational data were computed.
However, in an after-only experimental design such as the

present study, correlations involving attitudes need to be
interpreted with reservation since they may, in part, reflect
how an initial position on

a

given issue correlates with

another variable rather than how attitude change relates to
the other variable.

This interpretation is inconsistent,

however, with the fact that the variance of the attitude

scores in the control group was very small (X = 6.26, SD

=

.97)

and significantly different from the experimental groups
(X = 3.98,

p

.01).

SD = 1.69) by an F test

Therefor

(F

=

3.04,

df = 113/17,

individual differences in attitude

scores in the experimental groups primarily represent attitude
change.
It should be remembered that Haaland and Vankatesan

(1968) proposed that comprehension mediates the distraction

effects resulting in reduced attitude change for distracted
subjects.

While the results of the present study confirmed

that distracted subjects comprehended less,

the correlations

26

between attitude scores and combined comprehension
yielded
no significant relationships between these two
variables.

Therefore, the assumption that comprehension mediates attitude

change appears to be unwarranted at least in this study.
It is also possible to argue that the predicted effects
of

distraction upon attitude change are mediated by the reinforcing
value of the humorous film distraction.
the film is enjoyable and humorous,

For example, since

it could put the subject

in a pleasant frame of mind which could in turn make him more

receptive to
study,

a

a

counterat ti tudinal communication.

In this

measure of the reinforcing value of distraction

indicated that the distraction presentation was more aversive
than the no distraction presentation.

However, correlations

between this variable and attitude scores were not significant.
Thus,

it would appear that in this study the reinforcement

value of the distraction is not an important mediator of attitudes.

Festinger and Maccoby

(j.964)

claimed that the correlations

between attitude s.:ores and source rejection provided
indirect evidence that counter arguing mediated the effect
of distraction on attitudes.

However, the correlations

between attitude scores and source rejection in the present

study were not significant for either the distraction or the
no distraction conditions.

(Nevertheless,

there was

a

significant correlation between attitude and source rejection
data pooled over all subjects.)

Direct evidence that

distracted subjects were less able to counterargue the
communication was found in the analysis of variance for
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total counterarguing.

Moreover, both Brock and source rejection

counterarguments yielded X 2 effects of distraction although
the former measure only reached the .10 level of significance.
In addition,

correlations between attitude scores and total

counterarguing resulted in highly significant and consistent
relationships.

The more one counterargued the message, the

less likely he was to accept it.

Since both source rejection and total counterargument

production resulted in significant correlations with attitude
scores,

these mediators should be examined carefully in order

to determine if they could have canceled one another's effects

on attitude.

Such a cancellation could have resulted in

non-significant attitude effects even though distraction had
a

significant effect on some mediators.

It should be remembered

that source rejection yielded

a

distraction and discrepancy.

Although the interaction

significant interaction between

between distraction and discrepancy for total counterarguing
failed to reach significance, the pattern of cell means was
similar to that obtained for source rejection in that the
largest differences occurred at the high disciepancy level.
In other words,

the distracted subjects rejected the source

more than the non-distracted subjects at the high discrepancy
level while they also counterargued less.

According to the

correlational data, there is at least weak evidence that

increased source rejection inhibits attitude change and
there is stronger evidence that increased counterarguing

enhances attitude change.

Since the impact of these two
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mediators is greatest at the high discrepancy level, it is

conceivable that source rejection and total counter arguing

canceled each other's effects upon attitude change resulting
in the non-significant effects of the independent variables

upon attitude change.
In conclusion,

it is felt that while no effects of

distraction upon attitude change were obtained, valuable
.

insights into the operation of certain mediators were gathered

from the correlational data.

Comprehension was found to have

little effect upon attitude change while counter arguing

yielded

a

strong relation to attitude change.

Distraction

was found to be aversive and source rejection had

relation to atti tude change

.

a

weak

Further research can do much

to specify the precise roles of these mediators in attitude

change studies.

Specifically, it was suggested that one

approach to specifying the role of discrepancy in eliciting

counterarguing is to experimentally vary the subject's
exposure to message counterargumen ts

.

Other approa ches to

the study of the mediators of attitude change are left to
the individual

exod imenter.

4
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TABLE

1

Mean Posttest Attitude Scores

Low

Moderate

High

Discrepancy

Discrepancy

Discrepancy

No Distraction

3.84

4.00

3.63

Distraction

4.21

4.05

4.15

j

Note:

The lower the score, the more the attitude change.
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TABLE

2

Mean Combined Comprehension Scores

Low

Moderate

High

Discrepancy

Discrepancy

Discrepancy

No Distraction

7.63

7.58

8. 32

Distraction

6.68

6. 74

6.47

Note:

The higher the score,

the more the comprehension.

31

c

U

H-

o

co

Co

rt

rt

h

o

o

rt

ft

O
3

o
3
3
CO

C
H*
Co

o

ifl

3*

(D

co

a

HCo

O (D
h h

O
h

CD

0)

cd

•O

rt

P
0
o

3
o

O

CD

0
£

H-

O

Co

O
M

Hi

e

3

H c

a

(0

3"

O

CD

o

CD

CD

pj

cd

tJ

0

rt

*0

DJ

&J

Olj

(D

3

O

3
O

3
o

^<

^<

ft

3*
CD

O
c

»-3
J

3
o

3
o

CD

CD

CD

JC
CD
CD

O

CD

rt"

CD

H-

h
o
o

O
3

o

3

o
c
3

Hi

O

a

3

rt
rt

CD

w

3*
a>

H

H

L_J.

to
CO

CD

Co

CD

CD

U)
us
(D

rt

H-

0)

O
3

3

3
O

c:

3
CD

3
ft
CO

ft
&>

o
CD

O

h
o o

cd

to

a

rt

CD

o
c
3

O
O
7?

ft
CD

H-

CD
CO

O
3

CO
&J

C
0)
CD

O

O CD
C CU
3 3

cc

CD

CO

LJ.
CD

O

»-3

H-

•

O

-J

rt

O
3

CO

H

X

rt

ft

rt
t

3

(D

V

-J
LQ

3
CD

3
rt
0)

H

32

TABLE

4

Mean Source Rejection Scores

Low

Moderate

High

Discrepancy

Discrepancy

Discrepancy

No Distraction

8.95

8.84

7.

Distraction

8.53

7.

Note:

68

26

9.63

The higher the score, the more the source rejection.
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TABLE

5

Summary of Correlations between Attitude
Scores
and Potential Mediators of Attitude Change 1

No
Distraction

Distraction

All Subjects

.24

-.04

(55)

.06

Combined
Comprehension

(55)

(112)

Total

Counterarguments

.36** (55)

.49**

(55)

.39** (112)

.19

(55)

.24

(55)

.22*

(112)

.05

(55)

.24

(55)

.14

(112)

Source
Re j ection

Reinforcement Value
of Distraction

Note:

Numbers in parentheses indicate df

p

<

.05

** p

<

.01

*

.
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